Food safety, food fraud and food defense: a fast evolving literature 1 2
Introduction 19
Contamination in the context of food can be described as "the introduction or occurrence of an 20 unwanted organism, taint or substance to packaging, food, or the food environment" (BRC, 21 2 this clause if the quantity of such substance in such food does not ordinarily render it injurious 28 to health." Thus an adulterant can be deemed to be any poisonous or deleterious substance. 29
Section 343 of the same legislation defines misbranded food as food that is falsely or 30 misleadingly labeled, offered for sale under another name, is an imitation of another food, 31
where a container is misleading as to the contents. The term adulterated food as described 32 above does not distinguish explicitly between intentional or unintentional addition of an 33 adulterant. Lipp (2011) stated that to differentiate between the terms contamination and 34 adulteration, and by inference contaminant and adulterant, the former should be considered in 35 terms of unintentional activity and being technically unavoidable, whilst adulteration is 36 intentional replacement of an ingredient that is specifically motivated e.g. for economic or 37 ideological gain. 38
It should be considered that although the terms contamination and malicious contamination 39 have been used widely in the literature, some US literature distinguishes between contamination 40 and adulteration in that the former is used to describe instances of unintentional contamination 41 whilst the latter term is used to define all intentional activities whether motivated for economic 42 gain (EMA) or not. In this paper if literature is quoted that has described an event as 43 contamination, whereas the US definition would define it as adulteration, for purposes of 44 accuracy to the original source that term has remained in the text. However, consideration 45 should be given going forward when developing supply chain standards and regulations to 46 ensure common terminology use as this would be of value. 47
Whilst historically food safety was described as the concept that food will not cause harm to 48 the consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its intended use (BS EN ISO 22000, 49 2005) i.e. a term encompassing both (a) intentional acts and (b) unintentional contamination, 50 more recent literature seeks to differentiate between the two. PAS 96 (2014) defines a hazard 51 as something that can cause loss or harm which arises from a naturally occurring or accidental 52 3 event or results from incompetence or ignorance of the people involved compared to a threat 53 being something that can cause loss or harm which arises from the ill-intent of people. FSIS 54 (2014) characterizes food safety and food defense as being distinct issues that need to be 55 addressed namely that food safety refers to protecting the food supply from unintentional 56 contamination whereas food defense refers to protecting the food supply from intentional 57 adulteration with a motive to cause harm. Alternatively the Global Food Safety Initiative (GSFI, 58 2013) suggests that food defense is a sub-set of food safety issues (where the adulterant 59 has the potential to cause harm and separate where the agent is non-harmful rather than the 60 FSIS definition of them being a separate set of issues. 61
The potential for food crime is often influenced by a difference between availability and 62 demand creating an opportunity for criminals or fraudsters to financially benefit from the 63 shortfall. The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing "when all people 64 at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life" 65 (WHO, nd). Defra (2006) goes further and defines levels of food security as: individual or 66 household food security relating to purchasing power which is determined by income, access 67 to resources, and affordability of food; regional food security where regions are dependent on 68 key distribution routes for food; national/trading block food security relates to the ability of 69 a country or trading block to assess sufficient foodstuffs, even in the face of severe disruptions 70 to the supply chain; and global food security i.e. the ability of the world's food producers to 71 meet global demand, and ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of global trading and 72 distribution systems. The interconnecting factors that frame food security also influence the 73 opportunities for food crime. 74
Crime is defined as an offence or illegal acts punishable by law. The term "illegal" can be 75 considered as being unlawful, contrary to law or an activity which the law directly forbids 76 (Rapalje and Lawrence, 1997). Food crime can be described as an activity organized by 77 4 individuals or groups who knowingly set out to deceive, and or injure, those purchasing and 78 consuming food (adapted from Elliott Review, 2014). This rationale would suggest that food 79 crime occurs when food is intentionally modified in order to bring harm to individuals or for 80 purposes of economic gain and both situations may lead to issues of food safety or food quality. 81
Two brothers who owned and operated Jensen Farms in Colorado pled guilty to charges 82 associated with the introduction of cantaloupe adulterated with Listeria monocytogenes 83 rendering the product injurious to health into interstate commerce (FDA, 2013). Thus it was 84 determined that the cantaloupe bore a poisonous substance that rendered them injurious to 85 health. In May of 2011 the Jensen brothers allegedly changed their cantaloupe cleaning system. 86
The new system, built to clean potatoes, was installed, and was to include a catch pan to which 87 a chlorine spray could be included to clean the fruit of bacteria. The chlorine spray, however, 88 was never used. In this example the term adulteration is suggests that by intentionally failing to 89 implement a process that is specifically designed to minimize the risk of harm to consumers 90 then a criminal act has taken place. 91 Fraud can simply be described as: a type of criminal activity that can be an abuse of position, 92 or false representation, or prejudicing someone's rights for personal gain (SFO, nd). Food fraud 93 is defined by the Food Standards Agency (FSA) as: "deliberately placing food on the market, 94 for financial gain, with the intention of deceiving the consumer" (Elliott Review, 2014). The 95
Elliott Review (2014:6) states that "food fraud becomes food crime when it no longer involves 96 random acts by 'rogues' within the food industry but becomes an organised activity by groups 97 which knowingly set out to deceive, and or injure, those purchasing food" thus building on the 98
FSA definition. 99
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) determine economically motivated adulteration 100 (EMA) as "the fraudulent, intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a product for 101 the purpose of increasing the apparent value of the product or reducing the cost of its 102 5 production", i.e., for economic gain (Lutter, 2009) . EMA is therefore only one example of the 103 types of fraudulent activity that can occur in the food supply chain and EMA as a definition 104
should not be used when considering other types of fraudulent activity. This is discussed more 105 fully later in the paper. The aim of this research is to undertake a literature review and critique 106 the often contradictory definitions that can be found in the literature in order to compare and 107 contrast existing food crime risk assessment (FCRA) tools and their use. The use of the term 108 FCRA is novel and not currently used in the literature and as such is an evolving concept. Whilst 109 Elliott (2014) proposed the use of food crime prevention networks FCRA build on this as they 110 contain two distinct elements as is described in this paper. Firstly there is the risk assessment 111 process itself and then the development of a series of countermeasures that are embedded in a 112
food control system at organizational or national levels. Thus adopting Felson's approach 113 (2006) of identifying events, sequences and settings is helpful in developing food crime risk 114 assessment models. 115
The methodological approach that has been used in terms of critiquing existing academic and 116 gray literature is of value to academics and practitioners to clarify the current contradictions in 117 the literature and to develop a common, accepted vocabulary that is then utilized going forward 118 in the food industry. This element of redefinition will also inform future reviews of regulatory 119 standards and also global standards such as those developed through Codex Alimentarius and 120 the International Standards Organization (ISO). 121
Food defense 122
Food defense is the collective term used to describe activities associated with protecting the 123 nation's food supply from deliberate or intentional acts of contamination or tampering (FDA, 124 2014). Food defense therefore encompasses intentional contamination (perhaps better phrased 125 as adulteration) of the food supply contrasting with the unintentional contamination that is the 126 focus of established food safety measures (Mitenius et al. 2014 ). The authors suggest that the 127 6 concept of intentional adulteration as being separate from unintentional contamination 128 introduces the notion of a different set of vocabulary such as perpetrator, malicious intent and 129 capabilities. Further, food defense has been described as the process to ensure the security of 130 food and drink and their supply chains from all forms of intentional malicious attack including 131 ideologically motivated attack leading to contamination or supply failure (GFSI, 2013). This 132 definition suggests that the term food defense is not only used to define national strategy 133 towards intentional food adulteration, but also can be used at the supply chain and 134 organizational level. Indeed BRC (2015) considers food defense as the procedures adopted to 135 assure the safety of raw materials and products from malicious contamination or theft. 136 Therefore, food defense has been said to reflect the protection activities, and/or the security 137 assurance process or procedures that deliver product safety with regard to intentional acts of 138 adulteration. These policies, processes and procedures will be defined in this paper as 139
countermeasures (see Section 3). Countermeasures are the means and mechanisms 140
implemented to mitigate risk and as a phrase widely used in criminology literature. 141
Food defense strategies can therefore be implemented at national and local levels. The FDA 142
(2015) has differentiated between national risk assessment models and supply chain or 143 organizational food defense models. At national strategy level, in the US the CARVER+ Shock 144 method has been adopted where the acronym CARVER stands for: Criticality -a measure of 145 the public health and economic impacts of an attack as a result of the batch size or network of 146 distribution; Accessibility -the ability to gain physically access and egress where this can 147 change over time and also as a result of the use of counter-measures; Recuperability -the 148 ability of food system to recover from an attack; Vulnerability -the ease of accomplishing the 149 attack. This too can change over time and as a result of the use of counter-measures; Effect -150 the amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production; Recognizability -151 the ease of identifying the target, with Shock a combined measure of the health, psychological, 7 and collateral national economic impacts of a successful attack on the target system being the 153 final element (FDA, nd). 154
A vulnerability assessment (VA) tool can be developed to operate at the food facility or 155 individual food process level. The VA tool specifically focuses on three elements that reflect 156 the vulnerabilities that exist and the means for their mitigation for an organization that could 157 potentially be under threat namely the attributes: Criticality, Accessibility, and Vulnerability. 158
This approach is sometimes referred to as Vulnerability Analysis Critical Control Point or 159 VACCP. The FDA and the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) adapted CARVER+ Shock 160 to also develop a vulnerability assessment software (VAS) tool that can be used at food facility 161 or process level in order to build a food defense plan (FDA, 2015) . The food defense plan 162 approach supports food business operators to develop personalized food defense plans by 163 integrating existing FDA tools, guidance, and resources into one single application (FDA, 164 2015). Therefore a situational and premises focused food defense plan can be established to 165 address the risk of intentional food adulteration. 2003) and such risk can be reduced by strengthening environmental resilience to mitigate such 171 risk (Clapton, 2014). Therefore, situational crime prevention seeks to reduce opportunities for 172 specific categories of crime by increasing the associated risks and difficulties and reducing the 173 rewards (Clarke, 1995) so situational crime prevention in terms of deterrence of food crime and 174 reduction of crime risk is an important consideration (Spink and Moyer, 2011) . 175
Crime vulnerability can be defined as the extent to which an individual, organization, supply 176 chain or national food system is at risk from, or susceptible to, attack, emotional injury or 8 physical harm or damage from an intentional act. The WHO (2002) suggested that vulnerability 178 should be assessed on the basis of the scientific, economic, political and social circumstances 179 of a country to measure the extent of the threat and to set priorities for resources. The WHO 180 further note that vulnerability should be assessed as a multidisciplinary activity, with input from 181 legal, intelligence, medical, scientific, economic and political sectors (Manning et al. 2005 ). On 182 a national level vulnerability may be assessed on the basis of a number of factors (Table 1) . 183
Further, the determined level of vulnerability needs to be routinely reassessed to ensure that the 184 ranking and prioritization of risk remains appropriate and that suitable countermeasure(s) 185 continue to be in place. 186 Table 1  187 188 Independently PAS 96 (2014) has been developed as a standard to underpin the Threat Analysis 189
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Critical Control Point (TACCP) approach to assessing the risk associated with such threats. 190 PAS 96 (2014) describes TACCP as the systematic management of risk through the evaluation 191 of threats, identification of vulnerabilities, and implementation of controls to materials and 192 products, purchasing, processes, premises, distribution networks and business systems by a 193 knowledgeable and trusted team with the authority to implement changes to procedures. 194 TACCP has been designed to interface with and build upon food safety risk management 195 methodology such as hazard analysis critical control point (HACCP) as many precautions taken 196 to assure the safety of food, are likely to also deter or detect deliberate acts of contamination 197 (PAS 96, 2014). TACCP uses a matrix type approach to identify the likelihood of an incident 198 occurring and how it might be mitigated through the use of appropriate countermeasures. This 199 approach is only of value where potential threats and the risk associated with them can be 200 assessed so it is of little value in mitigating against emerging issues when as previously outlined 201 the modus operandi is for the crime to continue undetected. (Table 2) . 212 Table 2  213 214 Criminal attributes can also be characterized into ideological, occasional, occupational, 215 professional and recreational types ). PAS 96 (2014) using a different 216 approach identifies a number of threats that need to be considered when undertaking TACCP 217 namely: EMA, malicious contamination, extortion, espionage, counterfeiting and cybercrime 218 with an associated typology for individuals that pose a threat: 219
• The extortionist. This extends beyond the product-orientated types of food fraud to consider wider organizational 227 fraud associated with accounting, organizational "secrets" e.g. recipes, unique processing 228 standards etc. When seeking to mitigate supply chain fraud assessment activities must consider 229 countermeasures that are implemented at the supply chain level not just at the facility level. 230
This parallels with the procurement requirement for the adoption of pre-requisite programs such 231 as good agricultural practice by suppliers that are designed to prevent food safety issues from 232 occurring in the first place rather than focusing on activities within a site-HACCP plan for 233 detection at facility level as the predominant level of control. 234
Criminology and understanding of behavioral science provides a wider insight into the 235 motivation and causation behind food crime. This research has considered the extent to which 236 food fraud and food defense fit into these theoretical criminological frameworks (Table 3) . 237 Table 3 considers six crime motivation theories and shows the difference between traditional 238 HACCP style risk assessment and the type of assessment that needs to be included in 239 approaches such as TACCP and VACCP. Using HACCP whilst the cause of a food safety 240 hazard is considered in terms how the hazard can arise in order to implement an appropriate 241 preventive measure the mindset of the perpetrator or the incentives to intentionally contaminate 242 have not been explicitly addressed. Furthermore if there is an argument that food safety, food 243 fraud and food defense need to be risk assessed separately there is not requirement to include 244 intentional food adulteration during the HACCP process. Food defense needs to consider the 245 perpetrator, the relevance of impact and their motivation to cause harm. Food fraud is driven 246 by singular motivation i.e. the desire for gain and in order to implement appropriate 247 countermeasures the motivational element of food fraud needs to be fully understood. 248 Table 3  249   250   11 The magnitude of harm caused by intentional adulteration in terms of likelihood and severity 251 will increase according not only to the agent used, but also if an individual can operate 252 unnoticed in an organization or operates in collaboration with the organization. The degree of 253 mitigation achieved by implementing appropriate countermeasures will vary by type of crime 254 and by the commitment of the management of the organization to minimize vulnerability to 255 crime (Table 4 ). Seven types of criminal are outlined in Table 4 from terms of likelihood and severity) is considered in Table 4 and will be unique to the situation 261 that arises. Typical countermeasures have been described for different types of criminal that 262 need to be considered within an effective food control program. 263
This complexity is shown further in Table 5 , and by using a slight modification of the 264 questioning (5 Whys see Motarjemi and Wallace, 2014) technique of root causes analysis firstly 265 food fraud and then food defense with regard to both internal employees and external agents 266 and the risk of intentional food adulteration is considered. The root cause analysis demonstrates 267 that a proactive approach to improving work and supply chain related practices and that focus 268 on intentional adulteration i.e. countermeasures and the utilization of FCRA tools to determine 269 vulnerability is essential in order to mitigate risk. The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) position paper on mitigating the public health risk of 293 food fraud (July 2014) considers the interaction of food defense, food fraud, food safety and 294 food quality. This approach does not clearly separate food safety, food quality, food defense 295 and food fraud but this may simply be a causal result of using a Venn diagram to pictorially 296 describe the interaction. This overlapping representation is in contrast to FSIS (2014) and the 297
FAO Assuring Food Safety and Quality: Guidelines for Strengthening National Food Control 298
Systems publication (2003:3) that states that: 299 "Food safety refers to all those hazards, whether chronic or acute, that may make food 300 injurious to the health of the consumer. It is not negotiable. Quality includes all other 301 attributes that influence a product's value to the consumer". 302
The FAO (2003) publication places particular importance on the fact that the clear distinction 303 between food safety and food quality and this has public policy implications and also 304 implications for the development of organizational management systems. Thus this separating 305 of terminology can be extended to the organizational development of food safety, food defense 306 and food quality plans, and determining their purpose in terms of what factors they are seeking 307 to control. Therefore the four elements of a food control system, otherwise determined as the 308 four elements of food protection (see Spink and Moyer, 2011) can be described as follows: 309
• Food defense -ideologically motivated intentional adulteration that makes the food 310 injurious to health. 311
• Food fraud -economically motivated intentional adulteration that may or may not 312 make the food injurious to health. Thus some food fraud issues may overlap with the 313 definition of food defense whilst others may be a food quality issue. 314
• Food safety -unintentional contamination of food that makes the food injurious to 315 health; and 316
• Food quality -delivery of attributes that influence a product's value to consumers. 317
These definitions have been drawn together visually (Figure 1 ). This approach differs from (i) 318 that of Spink and Moyer (2011) where they identified the four elements described above, as 319 being distinct i.e. no food fraud overlap between food quality and food safety (see Figure 2 ) 320 and (ii) that of GFSI (2014) where all four terms are seen as overlapping. 321
Take in Figures 1 and 2 322 14
The rationale for determining the four elements food safety, food defense, food fraud and food 323 quality as highlighted in this research is important when developing either a national or an 324 organizational food control system. 325 326
Approaches to developing independent food crime risk assessment (FCRA) 327
Increasingly there is a requirement to consider a more holistic approach that encompasses not 328 only scientific criteria, but also aspects of social science in order to risk assess adulteration. Six 329 of the existing FCRA models have been compared ( Table 6 ) in terms of their aims, mechanisms 330 of operation and practicalities of use. Table 6 highlights the value of each model in different 331 situations. The ability to actually quantify the likelihood of a threat or vulnerability in a given 332 situation is in many ways influenced by the degree of adoption of countermeasures and their 333
effectiveness. 334
Take in Table 6  335 The standard BS EN ISO 31000: 2009 -Risk management: principles and guidance provides 336 principles, framework and a process for managing risk. The standard defines uncertainty (or 337 lack of certainty) as a state or condition that involves a deficiency of information and leads to 338 inadequate or incomplete knowledge or understanding. In the context of risk management, 339 uncertainty exists whenever the knowledge or understanding of an event, consequence, or 340 The threat assessment uses a similar semi-quantitative matrix approach, but despite the name 375
CCPs are not identified as TACCP is more of a threat prioritization system based on the 376 presence or absence of appropriate countermeasures. The Carver+ Shock or CAV approach of 377 VACCP again uses a semi-quantitative scoring approach through a scoring system without 378 defining CCPs specifically. Marsh (2015) suggests that VACCP and TACCP must be 379 undertaken simultaneously so an organization can have a clear picture of both threats and 380 vulnerabilities. Instead of using CCPs, Marsh (2015) decided to use Vulnerability and Threat 381 Points (VTP) as a mechanism for prioritizing risk. In another approach, the NSF Fraud 382
Protection Model can be used to assist organizations to 'think like a criminal' -particularly in 383 assessing vulnerability from the perspective of what is advantageous to the fraudster (NSF, 384 2015) . Hence, the model was based on the assumption that fraudsters tend to target food 385 products of higher value where the adulteration is difficult to detect. This can be used to create 386 a hierarchy of low medium and high food fraud risk scenarios (Figure 3) . 387
Take in Figure 3 388
Five models have been analysed TACCP, VACCP, the food protection risk matrix (Spink and 389 Moyer, 2011), the food fraud model (NSF, 2014) and the CARVER + Shock Tool (FDA, 2014) . 390
The mechanisms employed are ones of semi-quantitative risk assessment using prioritization 391 matrices or weighted scoring systems. This approach is often weakened by the degree of 392 uncertainty as to the exact nature of the threat and its likelihood of occurrence. This means that 393 In many cases there is a requirement at national or organizational level for informed decision 409 making with regard to degree of risk that is also centered on the balance between cost and 410 benefit derived which is often difficult to determine in the case of unknown or un-quantified 411 threat. 412
Conclusion 413
The aim of this research is to undertake a literature review and critique the definitions that can 414 be found in the literature in order to compare and contrast existing FCRA models and their 415 application. Figure 1 has been developed to demonstrate the clear distinction between food 416 safety, food quality and food defense and the overlapping nature of food fraud incidents 417 depending on whether the intentional criminal activity has the potential to cause harm or impact 418 on product quality. This builds on existing literature by clearly differentiating what is and is not 419 included in terms of threat, or as in food safety defined as a food safety hazard, i.e. the cause 420 and then how the effect before and after countermeasures have been implemented is quantified 421 when undertaking a VACCP, TACCP or HACCP assessment. The challenge is that the 422 distinction between a potential threat (hazard) and the consequences (effect) should it arise, and 423 the difference between adulteration and unintentional contamination of food and thus the 424 associated countermeasures that should be adopted, is not always fully appreciated by 425 individuals at the facility level who are involved in developing an overarching food 426 protection/control system. This is an organizational weakness that can then lead to the 427 implementation of an adequate food protection/control system which is of little value to the 428 organization in mitigating threat. Intentional food crime is plural in nature in terms of the types 429 of crime and the differing levels of financial gain. This can also be said in terms of the 430 multiplicity of definitions of food safety, food defense, food fraud and food quality found in 431 both academic and gray literature. This plurality creates confusion and multiple interpretations 432 when FCRA is adopted and implemented. In further iterations of regulations, standards and 433 industry protocols increasing harmonization will benefit the industry in developing cohesive 434 food protection/control programs that address all four elements described in this paper and Factors that can be used to assess national food system vulnerability • The effectiveness of the countries food safety management infrastructure and current surveillance mechanisms; • Availability of potential food contamination agents;
• Motivation for perpetrators of food terrorism;
• Potential for the agent to contaminate mass produced food and gain widespread distribution;
• Potential of human-to-human transmission of the agent;
• Capability for an effective emergency response and;
• Potential size of the threat to the food supply chain, animal health and welfare, export food trade, tourism and public health. Use of words such as "natural", "traditional". Use of pictures e.g. depictions on packaging that do not reflect the nature of the product inside or the methods of production Packaging size 2 Use of overlarge packaging Attachment level of strength or weakness of relationships between an individual and others as via relationships. The stronger the social expectation, the stronger the attachment, the more likely the individual will conform. Commitment i.e. conformity to a particular lifestyle. The higher the level of commitment, the less likely the individual will deviate from it. Involvement -the time spent in conventional behavior or law abiding practices. The longer the time spent in engaging in these activities, the less time the individuals will have for other things.
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The final bond explains that if an individual had been brought up with the belief that they are law abiding citizens, the less likely they are to break the law.
Occurs when an individual feels deprived or perceive themselves as deprived. The sense of deprivation is commonly (but not exclusively) connected to material circumstances Material circumstances.
Economics / incentives as pull factor
Reconstructs the monetary incentives of profit-oriented actors. The likelihood for these economic actors to break rules increase with the probability of profits they expect to earn and reduces if losses are anticipated due to risk of detection. At the same time, fraud activities will decrease with an increase in social factors that could 'protect' or 'shield' the profitoriented actors from yielding to the economic temptation.
Estimates the incentives of actors in farm or food industries. Helps to identify or expose critical settings where economic temptations may arise.
Food fraud is driven by monetary needs or gains and / or greed.
Food defense Time, ability and information. Motivation to do harm.
Motivated offender with a clear potential victim.
No fear of consequences. Impact oriented. Impact oriented. Sadist, enjoy thrill of 'excitement' caused by the harm, revenge, envy. Domestic or international terrorist who commits the criminal act to make an ideological statement or to economically harm an entity, or to create panic and fear in the target population.
Magnitude will depend on the nature of the product, organization, supply chain and/or the population targeted.
Currently the use of risk assessment by organizations to identify appropriate controls e.g. security, tamper evidence, supplier assurance Recreational tampering and or theft. Why did the agent target this organization? Why did the employee feel dissatisfy or resentful? Why did the agent target this organization? Ability to perpetrate the crime without discovery, magnitude of financial gain compared to risk.
Unjust work-related practices, termination, personal grudge
Unjust business-related practices, personal grudge, ability to gain publicity due to organization's profile. 4
Why did illicit business related practices arise? What is it about the organization's profile that draws attention?
Why was the employee terminated? Why did unjust work-related practices arise in the company?
Why did unjust business-related practices arise with the company? What is it about the organization's profile that draws attention?
In order to answer the above specific questions, the respective organization can investigate reasons e.g. vulnerability to fraud, networks in which the business operates etc.
In order to answer the above specific questions, the respective organization can investigate if the above claims are true and find ways to resolve unjust work-related practices.
In order to answer the above specific questions, the respective organization can investigate reasons e.g. country of origin of organization, religious or ideological background, previous business practice that could warrant organization being seen as unjust. How proactive should the company be to reduce future external food threats? Adopt proactive approach to improve work related practices and conditions and utilization of appropriate analysis tool.
Adopt proactive approach to improve work related practices and conditions and utilization of threat analysis tool.
Adopt proactive approach to improve work and supply chain related practices and conditions and utilization of threat analysis tool. 
CARVER + Shock Tool (US FDA)

Aims
To assess threats and prevent behaviorally or ideologically motivated intentional adulteration (Leathers 2014) To assess how exposed/ susceptible organization or premise is to food fraud incidents.
Prevention of intentional EMA (Spink 2014)
To differentiate food fraud among other food control elements such as food safety, food defense and food quality.
To better anticipate the likelihood of fraudulent attack on food products especially according to product value.
To assist users in how to develop and implement a preventive system specifically for the adulteration of food ingredients.
Allows user to think like an attacker and to determine the most vulnerable point within a system or premise to an attack. To focus resources on protecting the most susceptible points in the system.
Mechanisms
Qualitative assessments (likelihood x impact) of threats Qualitative assessments (likelihood x impact) of threats Risk matrix is designed to identify the cause of risk and the motivations driving the fraud but not the effect.
Built on a 4 quadrant Boston
Consulting Group (BCG) matrix.
-Top right = products most attractive to fraudster -Bottom left = least attractive to fraudster -Size of circle of a food product represents the perceived difficulty of conducting the fraud.
Structured approach to characterize food fraud vulnerabilities with associated guidance to develop mitigation strategies.
Nine contributing factors considered and how they impact on vulnerability using a matrix approach.
Lifecycle approach proposed for food fraud management.
Based on seven attributes which are scored on a scale of 1-10 (FDA 2014)
• Criticality -measure of public health and economic impacts of an attack
• Accessibility -ability to physically access and egress from target • Recuperability -ability of system to recover from an attack • Vulnerability -ease of accomplishing attack • Effect -amount of direct loss from an attack as measured by loss in production • Recognizability -ease of identifying target • Shock -combined health, economic, and psychological impacts of an attack. Provides relative risk rankings for nodes / process steps in a production process or national food system. Practicalities
Likelihood and impact scores and use of priority matrix in TACCP provides hierarchy for action by risk for organizations. Assess threats within manufacturing environment or within an organization but will be difficult to assess suppliers i.e. prior to delivery (Marsh 2015) Can be used in the wider supply chain.
The four quadrants in the matrix assist in exploring criteria Food quality -may be caused by mishandling Food safety -may be caused by unintentional contamination Food fraud -intentionally done to increase profit margin Food defense -deliberately carried out to cause harm (Spink and Moyer, 2011)
Food industries and regulatory teams can use the model to anticipate which products are most likely to be targeted by fraudsters, the factors for targeting and whether previous frauds had occurred.
Four step process. First three characterize fraud vulnerabilities associated with an ingredient by considering occurrence and impact. Last step is guidance.
Critical or vulnerable nodes / process steps are identified based on the scores. Prioritize mitigation measures and resources to reduce likelihood of attack.
Another option in CARVER + Shock would be to only use the Criticality, Accessibility and Vulnerability (CAV) scores and facility or process line level.
Suggestions / Extensions
To assess both threats and vulnerabilities and combined under one system. Combine threat and vulnerability assessment and manage risk under one management system. 
Food Crime
Food Safety
